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Santrauka
Straipsnyje nagrinëjama galios sàvoka ir jos pateikimas trijø iðkiliø prancûzø mokslininkø teorijose, kurias
vienija gilus kritinis poþiûris á tradicinæ galios sampratà atskleidþiant maþiau pastebimus (netiesioginius ir simbolinius)
galios aspektus. Nepaisant nemenkø skirtumø tarp ðiø teorijø, jas galima priskirti atskirai teorijø grupei, siekianèiai
atskleisti “realià” galios prigimtá, kurios neástengia iðtirti politinë ar ekonominë analizë. Postûmá tokioms pastangoms
suteikia, pasak Foucault, naujosios galios panaudojimo technologijos, pavyzdþiui, tokie metodai kaip mokyklos
disciplina, kuri vaikus paverèia labai sudëtingø átakos ir manipuliacijos sistemø objektu. Todël naujosios ðiuolaikinës
visuomenës sàlygos reikalauja naujø socialinës teorijos refleksijø.
Lyginant su tradicinëmis teorijomis Bourdieu, Foucault ir Baudrillardo teorijø galios mikroanalizës áþvalgos yra
þymiai pranaðesnës. Nors ðiose teorijose viena ið pamatiniø prielaidø yra ta, kad galia yra iðsklaidyta visuomenëje, o
ne sutelkta tik vienoje ið jos daliø, galios suvokimas yra ganëtinai skirtingas. Jei Bourdieu teigia, kad galià galima
turëti ir analizuoja jos iðteklius, tai Foucault yra ásitikinæs, kad galia nëra individø ar grupiø nuosavybë ir tiria galios
funkcionavimo veiksnius. Tuo tarpu Baudrillard tvirtina, kad galia yra taip iðsklaidyta, kad nebëra prasmës kalbëti
apie jos ðaltinius ir raiðkà, deklaruodamas “tikrosios” galios mirtá. Kitas bendrasis ðiø teorijø bruoþas yra tas, kad
pabrëþiami specifiniai galios ir þinojimo ryðiai. Bourdieu teigimu, þinojimas yra simbolinis tam tikros pasaulio vizijos
diegimas;  pasak Foucault, þinojimas yra galia apibûdinti kitus ir kurti diskursus, tuo tarpu Baudrillardo nuomone,
þinojimas yra tiesiog vaizdiniø reprodukcija ir simuliacijos prieþastis.
Taigi visi trys autoriai nagrinëja galià santykiø perspektyvoje ir aiðkina galios santyká su tam tikromis strategijomis.
Nors ðias teorijas galëtumëme santykiðkai iðdëstyti post-modernëjimo kryptimi pradedant Bourdieu analize,
artimiausia tradicinei galios sampratai, iki Baudrillardo ironiðko poþiûrio á galios simuliacijà, visgi visos jos turi
savità ávairiø galios iðraiðkø aiðkinimo bûdà. Tokia poþiûriø ávairovë ypaè svarbi  mûsø laikø nesinchroniðkos
(Ernsto Blocho vartojamos sàvokos poþiûriu) socialinës aplinkos sàlygomis, nes mes gyvename ið karto keliuose
pasauliuose ir susiduriame su skirtingomis galios apraiðkomis.
Introduction
The issues of power and knowledge have
occupied a central position within sociological
analysis. From work of Weber the exercise of
power and domination has been conceptualised
within sociology as a constitutive feature of so-
cial life…
Barry Smart
N û d i e n o s  s o c i a l i n ë s  t e o r i j o s
The concept of “power” seems to be one of
the basic and most attractive but also one of
the most difficult to define in contemporary
sociology. In this essay it will be concentrated
on quite distinct from traditional perspective
notion of power, presented by the theories of
Bourdieu’s, Foucault’s and Baudrillard’s, what
will give possibility also to follow the emergence
of post-modern discourse on power.
There are a number of distinctive (or even
117
Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2002/2, ISSN 1392-3358
contradictory) perspectives of power, mostly
rooted in the Weber’s and/or Marx’s theories.
Weber understands by “power” the chance of
the man or number of men to realise their own
will in a communal action even against the re-
sistance of others who are participating in the
action (Weber 1978; 181). Besides, he also
separate notion of power and authority: when
the exercise of power was regarded by people
as legitimate, it became authority
(institutionalised power, as it Parsons called).
While Weber emphasises the importance of
force and defines the state as an institution
which have a monopoly of force, Marxist soci-
ology sees power concentrated in the ruling
class, besides power for them is rooted in eco-
nomics and involves class struggle
(Abercrombie, Hill, Turner 1994; 329). Such
general approaches inspired increase of inter-
est in power: a flowering of critics and new at-
tempts to define power in works of Parsons,
Mills, Dahl, Paulantzas, etc. However, among
these new theories it is possible to indicate one
more radical critique, which puts accent on the
more or less invisible (indirect and symbolic)
character of power, and thus unites such dif-
ferent theories as Bourdieu’s, Foucault’s and
Baudrillard’s.
The main incitement for this approach was
the need to look at power from perspective dif-
ferent than the juridical-political theory of sov-
ereign power and an analysis of the state and
to consider the material techniques of power
that are not compatible with relations of sov-
ereignty (Smart 1985; 80). Thus here the main
question emerges: how does a social system in
which a substantial section of the population is
obviously disadvantaged and exploited survive
without its rulers having to depend on physical
coercion for the maintenance of order?
(Jenkins 1992; 119). From this perspective, the
main task for new theories is to investigate the
‘real’ nature of power, which remained outside
the field of political and economical analysis.
As Foucault points out, “the state is superstruc-
tural in relation to a whole series of power net-
works that invest the body, sexuality, the fam-
ily, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so
forth” (Foucault 1986; 64). Thus the state  (or
class, group) is not able to cover the whole field
of actual power relations that are dispersed
through social body. Besides, alongside with
fundamental technical inventions, new forms
of government and especially increased role of
education and knowledge, new technology of
exercise of power also emerged. As Foucault
argues, it is evident in increased “significance
of methods like school discipline, which suc-
ceeded in making children’s bodies the object
of highly complex systems of manipulation and
conditioning” (Foucault 1986; 67). Thus these
new circumstances require new reflections in
social theories, what Bourdieu’s, Foucault’s and
Baudrillard’s works are trying to do, although
in a very different way as will be shown in this
essay.
Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power
It is reasonable to start from the Bourdieu’s
notion of power, because this French sociolo-
gist is less digress from traditional theories fo-
cus on the questions “Who has power and how
they get it and use it?”. However, in construct-
ing a theory of symbolic power, Bourdieu “at-
tempts to specify in theoretical terms the pro-
cesses whereby, in all societies, order and so-
cial restraint are produced by indirect, cultural
mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive
social control” (Jenkins 1992; 104). As
Bourdieu argued, while in previous ages people
refused to recognise it even where it was star-
ing them in the face, without turning power into
a “circle whose centre is everywhere and no-
where”, we have to be able to discover it in
places where it is least visible, where it is most
completely misrecognized (Bourdieu 1994;
163).
According to Bourdieu’s definition, “sym-
bolic power is a power of constructing reality”,
it is “invisible power which can be exercised
only with the complicity of those who do not
want to know that they are subject to it or even
that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu
1994; 164). Symbolic power is a subordinate
power: it is a transformed, i.e. not recogniz-
N û d i e n o s  s o c i a l i n ë s  t e o r i j o s
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able, transfigured and legitimated form of other
forms of power, similarly as transmutation of
the different kinds of capital (economic, cul-
tural or social) into symbolic one. Besides,
Bourdieu describes these kinds of capital as
resources of power. Thus power is something
that can be possessed and as such, symbolic
power can be accumulated or lost: “agents pos-
sess power in proportion to their symbolic capi-
tal, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they
receive from group” (ibid.; 164).
In this perspective, power is still the instru-
ment “to imply a certain claim to symbolic au-
thority as the socially recognised power to im-
pose a certain vision of the social world, i.e. of
the divisions of the social world” (Bourdieu
1994; 106). Here Bourdieu emphasises the role
of knowledge and particularly scientific theo-
ries by arguing that “social science must include
in its theory of the social world a theory of the
theory effect which, by helping to impose a more
or less authorised way of seeing the social
world, helps to construct the reality of that
world” (ibid.; 106). This way (or certain vision)
of seeing the social system Bourdieu calls as
‘symbolic systems’, systems of mental struc-
tures, systems of classification or principles of
hierarchization.
These ‘symbolic systems’ fulfil their politi-
cal function, as instruments that “help to en-
sure that one class dominates another (sym-
bolic violence) by bringing their own distinc-
tive power to bear on the relations of power
which underlie them” (Bourdieu 1994; 167).
Thus Bourdieu employs in his theory of sym-
bolic power the perspective of conflicts and
class interests in terms that “the different
classes and class fractions are engaged in a sym-
bolic struggle properly speaking, one aimed at
imposing the definition of the social world that
is best suited to their interests” (ibid.; 167).
According to Bourdieu, these classes can en-
gage in this struggle either directly, in the sym-
bolic conflicts of everyday life, or else by the
struggle between the different specialists in
symbolic production. This process goes in a way
by which “the dominated fraction (clerics or
‘intellectuals’ and ‘artists’, depending on the
period) always tends to set the specific capital,
to which it owes its position, at the top of the
hierarchy of principles of hierarchization”
(ibid.; 168).
One of the main features of this symbolic
struggle is that “the ideological stances adopted
by the dominant are strategies of reproduction
which tend to reinforce both within and out-
side the class the belief in the legitimacy of the
dominant of that class” (Bourdieu 1994; 167).
The field of ideological stances thus reproduces
in transfigured form the field of social posi-
tions and also the established order that is
“largely secured by symbolic violence [the vio-
lence which is exercised upon a social agent
with his or her complicity], a process of cul-
tural reproduction” (Jenkins 1992; 147). Ac-
cording to Bourdieu, ideologies are always
“doubly determined, that they owe their most
specific characteristics not only to the inter-
ests of the classes or class fractions they ex-
press, but also to the specific interests of those
who produce them and to the specific logic of
the field of production” (Bourdieu 1994; 169).
This provides us with a means of avoiding the
Marxist reduction of ideological products to
the interests of the classes which they serve.
If to return to the mechanisms of symbolic
power, dominant discourse (ideology) in the
society is “a structured and structuring medium
tending to impose an apprehension of the es-
tablished order as natural” (Bourdieu 1994;
169). This is achieved through a process of
misrecognition, by which Bourdieu means “the
fact of recognition a violence which is wielded
precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it
as such” and it “certainly does not fall under
the category of influence” (ibid.; 169). For him,
there is much more powerful and insidious rea-
son than that: “being born in a social world, we
accept a whole range of postulates, axioms,
which go without saying and require no incul-
cating” (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992; 168). What
Bourdieu puts under the term of “recognition”,
then, “is the set of fundamental, pre-reflexive
assumptions that social agents engage by the
mere fact of taking the world for granted, of
accepting the world as it is, and of finding it
N û d i e n o s  s o c i a l i n ë s  t e o r i j o s
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natural because “their mind is constructed ac-
cording to cognitive structures that are issued
out of the very structures of the world” (ibid.,
168). The destruction of this power of sym-
bolic imposition based on misrecognition de-
pends on becoming aware of its arbitrary na-
ture, i.e. the disclosure of the objective truth
and the destruction of belief (Bourdieu 1994;
170).
To sum up, Bourdieu concentrates on the
diffused symbolic power, which presents in all
the social relations, can be possessed and used
as instrument of domination by individuals or
groups. However, his analysis of symbolic
power, as argued Jenkins, remains weak, for
example, at the institutional level. Institutional
approach is neglected by Bourdieu: how insti-
tutions are run and controlled, bureaucracy as
specifically modern social form, formality and
informality, inter- and intra-organisational poli-
tics, etc. What he seems to mean when he talks
about institutions, or, rather, how he consti-
tutes them sociologically, is as a category of
data about the individuals who work in them,
or are otherwise ‘members’. But “power and
domination are among the most important con-
cerns and characteristics of organisations and
institutions” (Jenkins 1992; 123). For such
critics can be answered, that Bourdieu specially
escaped this institutional level (as it is main-
tained by Jenkins) because of other aim to in-
vestigate the invisible aspects of power. Besides,
as Lash noticed, Bourdieu in indirect way re-
veals the relationship between symbolic power
and institutions: in modern societies direct sym-
bolic violence between subjects declines, in-
stead, fields or structures produce symbolic
goods and hence exercise symbolic power. It
shows that pre-modern power takes place via a
set of unmediated exchanges between subjects,
while modern power stems from a relationship
between fields (whose symbolic economy im-
parts to them their structure) and ‘consumer’
who is subject to this power (Lash 1992; 256).
Much more essential critics Bourdieu theory
of symbolic power received from the side of
Foucault.
Foucault’s  theory of disciplinary power
In contrast to Bourdieu, Foucault focuses
not on the questions “Who has power and how
they get it and use it?”, but rather on “How
does power function in society?”. Thus analy-
sis of power in this perspective addresses not
centralised and legitimate forms of power but
techniques that have become embodied in lo-
cal, regional, material institutions (Smart 1985;
78). For Foucault, power has strictly relational
character. It rises from Foucault’s view, that
power cannot be considered a possession or
capacity of groups or individuals (Foucault
1979; 98). Power is not simply a commodity
that may be acquired or seized. Rather, it runs
through the whole social body, functions in the
form of a chain, and is exercised through a pro-
ductive networks which are extended every-
where and in which all are caught (Foucault
1986; 61). From this viewpoint individuals are
not agents of power, as Smart pointed out, they
neither possess power nor have their potential
crushed or alienated by it; to the contrary, “one
of the prime effects of power [is] that certain
bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses,
certain desires come to be identified and con-
stituted as individuals (Smart 1985; 78).
According to Sarup, “Foucault states that
the mechanisms, techniques and procedures of
power were not invented by the bourgeoisie,
were not the creation of class seeking to exer-
cise effective forms of domination” (Sarup
1988; 74). Thus, instead of concentrating at-
tention on the motivation or interests of groups,
classes or individuals in the exercise of domi-
nation analysis, Foucault invites to direct the
analysis on mechanics of power, what were
never analysed (Foucault 1986; 58). In the
same way, Foucault rejects of his analysis also
traditional notions of ideology and repression
as negative, narrow and thus unusable. For him,
the notion of ideology always stands in virtual
opposition to something else which supposed
to count as truth, besides it refers to something
of the order of subject, and third, ideology
stands in secondary position to something
which functions as its infrastructure, as it ma-
N û d i e n o s  s o c i a l i n ë s  t e o r i j o s
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terial, economic determinant (ibid.; 60). Also
in defining the effects of power as repression,
according to Foucault, one adopts a purely ju-
ridical conception of such power; one identi-
fies power with a law that says no; power is
taken above all as carrying the force of a pro-
hibition (ibid.; 60). In this perspective, Fou-
cault “replaces a juridical, negative conception
of power with a technical and strategic one.
Modern power operates through the construc-
tion of ‘new’ capacities and modes of activity
rather than through the limitation of pre-exist-
ing ones” (Sarup 1988; 73).
Similarly to the methodology of Bourdieu
theory, Foucault also argues that “analysis
should proceed from micro-level [not from
macro-institutional, e.g. the power of the state]
in order to reveal the particular histories, tech-
niques and tactics of power. Such an ascend-
ing analysis of power would in addition be able
to reveal how mechanisms of power have been
appropriated, transformed, colonised and ex-
tended by more general or global forms of
domination [how particular mechanisms of
power became economically advantageous and
politically useful] (Smart 1985; 78). Of course,
the critics of Foucault argue against this posi-
tion because in their opinion he “neglects the
state and focuses only on the micro-powers
that are exercised at the level of daily life”
(Sarup 1988; 79).
 Foucault theory puts the main accent on
the relationship between power and knowledge.
In fact, Foucault started from structuralism
where all relations were seen as linguistic, sym-
bolic, discursive. Later he found such linguis-
tic model to be limited and became increas-
ingly interested in power. For Foucault, “it is
not possible for power to be exercised without
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not
to engender power” (Sarup 1988; 74). He
emphasised the interdependence of power and
knowledge: “there is no power relation with-
out the correlative constitution of a field of
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time
power relations (Foucault 1979; 27).
Similarly to Bourdieu, Foucault argues that
“knowledge is a power over others, the power
to define others” (Sarup 1988; 67). It is pos-
sible because power “produces reality”; it “pro-
duces domains of objects and rituals of truth”
(Foucault 1979; 194). As Foucault argues,
“truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power:
contrary to a myth, truth isn’t the reward of
free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor
the privilege of those who have succeeded in
liberating themselves” (Foucault 1986; 72). In
fact, truth induces regular effects of power:
“each society has its regime of truth, its “gen-
eral politics” of truth: that is, the types of dis-
course which it accepts and makes function as
true; the mechanisms and instances which en-
able one to distinguish true and false statements,
the means by which each is sanctioned; the tech-
niques and procedures accorded value in ac-
quisition of truth; the status of those are
charged with saying what counts as true” (ibid.;
73). For Foucault, as Sarup noticed, nothing in
society will be changed if the mechanisms of
power [thus regime of true] that function out-
side, below and alongside the state apparatuses
on a much more minute and every level are not
also changed (Sarup 1988; 79).
The regime of truth in modern society, ac-
cording to Foucault, induces disciplinary
power. This new type of power, disciplinary
power, has been described as a ‘fundamental
instrument in the constitution of industrial capi-
talism and of the type of society that is its ac-
companiment’ and its development and exer-
cise as inextricably associated with the emer-
gence of particular apparatuses of knowledge
and the formation of the human sciences”
(Smart 1985; 80). Foucault emphasised the
role of human sciences because it “have made
man a subject of study and a subject of the state.
There has been an unrelenting expansion of
rationalised systems of administration and so-
cial control” (Sarup 1988; 72).
For Foucault, discipline is “a specific tech-
nique of power that regards individuals both
as objects and as instruments of its exercise”,
moreover, “it functions as a calculated, but
permanent economy” (Foucault 1979; 170).
Discipline provides procedures for ‘correct’
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training or for coercing bodies (individual or
collective). The means through which disciplin-
ary power achieves its hold are hierarchical
observation [surveillance], normalising judge-
ment, and examination. Hierarchical observa-
tion secretly prepares a new knowledge in the
‘observatories’ (i.e. military camps, hospitals,
prisons, schools, etc.) of human multiplicities:
“it provided the basis on which a new configu-
ration of power developed, one that organized
and arranged space to facilitate observation of
those within, and by rendering people visible it
in turn made it possible to know them and to
alter them” (Smart 1985; 86). Normalising
judgement is related with specific form of pun-
ishment because it in a regime of disciplinary
power is not expiation or direct repression by,
rather, normalisation in terms of reducing gaps
between people. Thus, in effect what is being
punished is “non-conformity which the exer-
cise of disciplinary power seeks to correct”
(ibid.; 86). But, as Foucault pointed out, “pun-
ishment is only one element of a double sys-
tem: gratification-punishment” (Foucault 1979;
180). In this perspective can be argue, that such
mechanism (or technique) of power are more
exhaustive than Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic violence’.
The examination combines both previous
mechanisms of power: it is a normalising gaze,
a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify,
to classify and to punish.  Here are combined
the ceremony (rituals) of power and the form
of examination, the deployment of force and
the establishing of truth (ibid.; 184).
All these mechanisms of discipline from one
side impose homogeneity (in terms of the nor-
mality), but from other side, they also play part
in classification, hierarchization and the dis-
tribution of rank by making possible to mea-
sure gaps, to determine levels, etc. (ibid.; 184).
However, in general the accent in description
of these mechanisms seems to be not on the
process of individualisation, but, rather, on the
specific technology of power [discipline] which,
as Foucault puts, fabricates individuals. For
such perspective the theory of Foucault is
criticised, i.e. by Dreyfus and Rabinow: “Dis-
cipline and Punish tells a story of the objectifi-
cation of human beings through the use of
power-knowledge, and its critique of power and
society is largely an extension of this imagery
of dehumanizing domination” (Garland 1994;
170).
Other critique of Foucault theory concerns
(similarly as critique of Bourdieu) the lack of
institutional level, besides, as Garland argue:
“Foucault’s works refuses to make discerning
judgements about the different purposes to
which ‘power’ can be put, and in so doing, im-
plies that one is no better than any other” (Gar-
land 1994; 170). There are only some points
of critique (and perhaps critique of ‘post-mod-
ern’ features of this theory), other kind (and
directed towards undeveloped  ‘post-modern’
features) of critique is provided by Baudrillard.
III. Baudrillard on “the end of social”
(post-modern perspective of power)
While Foucault and also Bourdieu argue that
individuals are constituted by power relations,
power being the ultimate principle of social
reality, Baudrillard insists that in post-modern
society phenomena which they describe (and
helped constitute) have radically changed. For
him “power is so dispersed, pulverised, and
dematerialised that it is seemingly impossible
to chart its trajectories, structures, relations
and effects” (Kellner 1989; 134). While Fou-
cault also dispersed power through a multiplic-
ity of sites, discourses, practices and strategies,
according to Baudrillard, he failed to analyse
simulations of power.
In his early works, Boudrillard generally
cited Foucault positively, and often borrowed
terminology, examples and strategies from him
(i.e.  Baudrillard’s genealogy of the order of
simulacra1 followed the model of Foucault’s
epistemes, or structures of knowledge). How-
ever, later he began to question more aggres-
sively some of the basic concepts of radical
social theory - power, desire, revolution and
social itself (Kellner 1989; 131). But the influ-
ence of Foucault theory is still significant in
terms of choice of important themes, especially
that consists power.
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 Like Foucault, power for Baudrillard no
longer resides securely anchored in spheres like
the economy or in institutions like state, pris-
ons and so on, but is radically dispersed
throughout society. According to Baudrillard,
post-modern semiurgy proliferates signs of
power, and power comes to reside in codes,
simulations, media and the like. Moreover, “in
contemporary post-modern society the prolif-
eration of signs of power and simulation mod-
els have so radically decentred power that it
has now mutated into signs of dead power”
(Kellner 1989; 134).  Thus, Baudrillard
grounds his theory of power on this more gen-
eral assumptions about era of simulation - the
end of social and power also.
Baudrillard argues that in post-modern era,
in era of the media and consumer society,
people have less and less relationships to ex-
ternal ‘reality’: they are caught up in the play
of images.  In fact it is “world of simulacra
where the image or signifier of an event has
replaced direct experience and knowledge of
its referent or signified” (Sarup 1993; 164).
Thus, it is world of total simulations, where
simulations are “different from a fiction or lie
in that it not only presents an absence as a pres-
ence, the imaginary as a real, it also undermines
any contrast to the real, absorbing the real
within itself” (Baudrillard 1996; 6).
According to Baudrillard, the challenge of
simulation is irreceivable by power. How can
you punish the simulation of virtue? The es-
tablished order can do nothing against it, for
the law is a second-order simulacrum [moder-
nity] whereas simulation is a third-order
simulacrum [post-modernity], beyond true and
false, beyond equivalencies, beyond the ratio-
nal distinctions upon which function all power
and entire social stratum. Further, in the world
where nothing is real power itself eventually
breaking apart in this space and becoming a
simulation of power, disconnected from its aims
and objectives, and dedicated to power effects
and mass simulation. By this logic, as is the fact
that power is no longer present except to con-
ceal that there is none (Baudrillard 1996; 179).
For Baudrillard, ‘true’ power is, or was (if
to take into account what it was in modern so-
ciety), a structure, a strategy, a relation of
force, a stake (Baudrillard 1996; 181). As it
can be noticed, it is more related with law, co-
ercion, thus it has no productive dimension as
Foucault’s notion of power. Baudrillard sug-
gests that it is like the DNA code which “domi-
nates and controls flows and intensities of
behaviour, and that therefore to fetishize a
molecular politics or a micropolitics of desire
might be to advocate a politics of liberation in
a sphere which itself may be controlled by co-
ercive, and in some cases unknown, powers”
(Kellner 1989; 139). Unlike Foucault, he main-
tains that power can be accumulated and pre-
served, thus in this argument Baudrillard is
closer to Bourdieu views. Besides, he claims
that “power by its nature is reversible, that the
dominated can always become the ones who
dominate, that the terms of power are always
subject to radical reversal, and that power re-
lations are thus always becoming undone, re-
versing and redefining themselves” (Kellner
1989; 134). However, in the era of simulations,
power (as was showed above) comes down to
nothing more than the critical obsession with
its survival that becomes greater the more it
disappears. It can results in “melancholy for
societies without power: this has already given
rise to fascism, that overdose of power refer-
ential in a society which cannot terminate its
mourning” (Baudrillard 1996; 180). Besides,
according to Baudrillard, it is not possible to
speak about ideology of power: “it is no longer
a question of the ideology of power, but of the
scenario of power. Ideology only corresponds
to a betrayal of reality by signs; simulation cor-
responds to a short-circuit of reality and to its
reduplication by signs. It is always the aim of
ideological analysis to restore the objective
process; it is always a false problem to want to
restore the truth beneath simulacrum” (ibid.;
182).
In post-modern consumer society power is
nothing but the object of a social demand, and
hence subject to the law of supply and demand,
rather than to violence and death. Completely
expunged from the political dimension, it is
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dependent, like any other commodity, on pro-
duction and mass consumption (ibid., 181).
Power, too, for some time now produces noth-
ing but signs of its resemblance. And at the
same time, another figure of power comes into
play: that of a collective demand for signs of
power  - a holy union which forms around the
disappearance of power (ibid.; 180).
According to Baudrillard, the best example
of power functioning in such society is the
media. He argues that in case of the media it is
possible sustain two opposing hypotheses: they
are the strategy of power, which finds in them
the means of mystifying the masses and of im-
posing its own truth. Or else they are the stra-
tegic territory of the ruse of the masses, which
exercise in them their concrete power of the
refusal of truth, of the denial of reality. Now
the media are nothing else than a marvellous
instrument for destabilising the real and the
true, all historical or political truth (there is
thus no possible political strategy of the me-
dia: it is a contradiction of terms) (Baudrillard
1996; 217). Therefore the media “manipulate
in every sense at once. No one can control this
process: the media are the vehicle for the simula-
tion which belongs to the system and for the simu-
lation which destroys the system…” (ibid.; 218).
According to Kellner, a comparison of
Foucault’s theories with those of Baudrillard
would allow us to show “what is wrong with
Baudrillard’s way of seeing and theoretical per-
spectives” (Kellner 1989; 141). First, for “those
condemned to work or condemned to live in
prisons, hospitals and mental institutions,
[power] is all too real”; secondly, power func-
tions in a multitude of ways in everyday life
that should not be ignored. Dominant forms
of power often focus on and attempt to shape
and channel desire in such a way that desire
and power become interrelated, especially in
the consumer society and in the mass politics
of the twentieth century” (ibid.; 141). How-
ever, works of Baudrillard reveal some other
significant features of power as simulation of
power in post-modern society that in accor-
dance with other novelties, as Poster pointed
out, “represents the beginning of a line of
thought, one that is open to development and
refinement by others” (Baudrillard 1996; 8).
Conclusions
To sum up, the theories of Bourdieu’s,
Foucault’s, and Baudrillard’s, despite all dif-
ferences between them, present one perspec-
tive of power. All of them agree that in pur-
pose to investigate the nature of power it is
necessary to deconstruct this phenomenon. All
of these theories derive far from traditional
ones by the focusing on the microanalysis of
power and reducing the institutional level.
Moreover, they emphasised the relation of
power and knowledge in a broad terms that
includes Bourdieu’s knowledge as symbolic
imposition of the certain vision of world,
Foucault’s knowledge as power to define oth-
ers and to produce discourses and truth, and
Baudrillard’s knowledge as reproduction of
images and cause of simulation.
These theorists adopt a relation approach
to power and explore the links between power
and strategies. Power in all these theories is
considered as dispersed throughout the soci-
ety (social body), but Bourdieu tries to describe
the resources of power (in same time arguing
that power can be possessed), Foucault focuses
on the functioning of power (by considering
that power is not the commodity of individuals
or groups), while Baudrillard insists that power
is so dispersed that is no sense to speak about
it’s structures and effects and manifests the
death of ‘true’ power, because in post-modern
society all that remains is the illusion of power
- “the interplay of codes and simulacra replaces
relations of power and domination” (Kellner
1989; 139). However, it is possible to notice
another similarity: all of them are interested in
‘micro-revolts’ - “multiplicity of dispersed mi-
cro-power relations” (Sarup 1988; 82). But if
Bourdieu maintains the individual as active
agent, Foucault states that individual is not
more an agent of power, rather “the individual
is both an effect of power and the element of
its articulation” (Smart 1985; 79). More com-
plicated situation of relations of individual and
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power in Baudrillard’s theory: because power
disappears, individual can not neither possess
it, nor use it, all that remains is simulation of
power and nostalgia for power.
Thus, it can be concluded that in the post-
modern discourse on power these theories can
be ordered by starting from Bourdieu (with his
closeness to traditional approach on power by
emphasis on sources and domination dimen-
sion of power), further, Foucault (with his
deconstruction of mechanics of power and fo-
cusing on locality), and finally, Baudrillard
(with his irony, gaming and profit of simula-
tion of world). However, such schema is too
simplified that it is better, as Kellner proposes,
to adopt Ernst Bloch’s notion of
nonsynchonicity. Therefore Kellner argues that
“we are currently in a transitional
nonsynchonic social situation in which we live
in many worlds at once, and thus need a multi-
plicity of viewpoints to make sense out of vari-
ous domains of our social experience” (Kellner
1989; 142). Thus, at times we still face the ac-
cumulation of power resources and struggle for
domination; “at other times we are confronted
with the more subtle forms of disciplinary or
normalising power or the panoptic powers of
surveillance which Foucault describes so well;
and sometimes we find ourselves in the new
situations which Baudrillard evokes, as when
we are confronted with political or religious
simulacra or with media signs which attempt
to seduce us into purchases, normalised
behaviour, voting or whatever” (ibid.; 142).
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Footnotes
1 For Baudrillard, ‘simulacra’ are reproductions of ob-
jects or events, while the ‘orders of simulacra’ form vari-
ous stages or ‘orders of appearance’ in the relationships
between simulacra and ‘the real’ (Kellner 1989; 78).
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